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Abstract 
Theories which are proceeded aiming to hold their consistency by m巴ansof revision ofaxiomatics， are 
objectivisms. Undecidabiliti巴smay be thought to emerge from the imperfect correspondence between the 
original constitutions and their set-theoretical int巴rpretations.So the annexed set theory is taken up and is 
found， inefect， toyield much work in association with the int巴ndedobjectivism 
o. Introduction 
Given a universe U of primitive objects， ifwe intend to see which events on U are to be 
thought as true， the theory of the events there to be developed is an objectivism. On looking 
back over the history， we find some theories such as geometry and the number theory etc. had 
been preceded by a handsome amount of knowledges obtained in several ways before they 
were systematized. Devices were later on laid down in order to make these knowledges 
completely c1arified and extensively advanced. Signs and definitions were made to build up 
a proper language for the intended objectivism and axiomatics was searched to raze out al 
ambiguousnesses from its course of proceeding. 
It is the objectivist point of view that， ifsome disagreeable result is concluded from the 
construction presently assumed， revisions should be tried on its axiomatics until it ceases to 
reproduce such viciousness again. The whole system of the definitions， axioms and the 
results (or theorems) to date obtained is called the ρroto-construction (or the ρroto-system) of 
the intended objectivism. Axioms are particularly criticized in connection to epistemo-
logical reflections and are changed if needed. Such a treatment may be founnd as of the 
same stand wi th the ‘realist' attitude which Bourbaki has adopted.l} 
To say a proposition to be valid means that it is provable in the proto-construction 
Though we conveniently say a proposition is true when it is valid， a true proposition may not 
always be valid. For example， the proposition “There are infinitely many pairs of twin prime 
numbers" might be true， though it has not yet been shown to be valid. Incidentally， after 
some renovation has been made， something formerly thought to be valied may possibly be 
thought to be invalid (or false) in the new construction. 
In an objectivism every inquiry is put forward in the form “Whether so and so is true or 
not"， that is， itis of bivalent prospect. However， we have really experienced several in 
qumes which could neither be concluded as valid nor invalid， that is， were undecidable 
though at the outses had been assumed to be of bivalent prospect. In so far as the proto-system 
is consistent， suce mqumes may occur only because their contents cannot perfectly be 
therein defind out. Yet， on the other side， they may truely cast new lights to promise 
本紀図谷芳雄
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some supplementalleaps to the intended objectivism， ifsufficient reflections are paid. Thus， 
in trying analyses on various sorts of events， to reveal imperfectness of the proto叫 Tstem
ofaxioms to decompose out their contents wil make a very important part of our study. 
1. Annexed Set Theory 
If for each member of a finite set of events {e1，…，enf = En a property ρis uniformly 
fulfilled， we sayρis verified in En. In this case each ek (k = 1， 2，…， n) is considered 
to gi ve an evidence for the property ρand if n is found to be > 1ρis considered as a 
possible property in the system. Generally， ifwe are convinced that for everyevent contained 
in a set Aρis fulfilled， we say also thatρis verified in A. If the supremum R(ρ) of such A's 
exists as a set (i.e.， a determinate aggregate)， and ifρis surely verifiable in R(ρ)， then R(ρ) 
is referred as the range ofρIn this connection the set R(ρ) is， as it were， the maximum 
extension of En. 
As it is， such an R(t) as defined in the above canot always give a clear objecιFor 
instance， the total collection of things which are not considered to be ‘whi te' may only be an 
intractable divergence as by severaI authors has been noticed. To be exempted from such 
di vergence of conception， there must precede a uni versal set of events L (t ) tobe existent to 
restrict such that 
En S. R(ρ) S.L(ρ) . 
This L(ρ) is to be introduced as the total aggregate of events over which is properly inquired 
whether the propertyρis fulfilled or not， and in this connection is referred as the level ofρ. 
Thus a propertyρcannot be haphazardly presented， but it is thought requisite to be associated 
with a set L(ρ) as its level， that is， to be quantified by the set L(ρ). Quantified properties 
are objectivisitρroρerties. However， if no confliction is feared for， we simply cal them 
ρrotertzes 
For two propertiesρ1and ρ2， ifevery event of L (ρ2) is found to be an event on L(ム)
(or an event of events， oran event of events of events etc.)， then we say“L(ρ2) is of higher 
order than L (ρ1)" or "t2 stands on a higher level than 百， However， we shall simply use 
the term ‘event' regardless of its level， ifno need of showing it. 
Starting from the primitive universe， on repeating definitions we may obtain various 
levels and for each of them we may take its subsets. An objectivism may thus have a 
variety of sets for observation， so that may there.upon be constituted a theory of sets peculiar 
to it. We cal this theory the annexed set theoηof the intended objectivism， Itwill be 
particularly notable that sets or classes from the annexed set theory may in their turn emerge 
in a similar way to that of information sources. In this connection it is important that the 
annexed set theory is found to be based on a proper extension of the set of the direct 
interpretations from the proto.construction. 
To assume a propositionρeither to be true or false， we think it necessary that P can be 
quantitativery interpreted in the annexed set theory， that is， there can be found a proposition 
P' in the annexed set theory such that 
(328) 
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P' .<=二:>.P 
(read : IfP' is true so is P， and inversely). Such a proposition P is called an objectivist 
ρroρosition. But we shall henceforth mean by ‘αρroρosition' an objectivist one. Trans-
ference of observation from about P to about P' is considered to be an objectivist analysis. 
2. Annexed Methodology 
If two properties ρand q have the same level L and if R(ρ) S R(q) (SL)， then we 
wnte as 
ρ 二中 q， (2.1) 
and say“ρzmρlies q". We shall not adopt the material implication (or the conditional 
sentence) 
ρコ q. 三 ~ρVq.
This is found to be a property of which the range R(ρコq)is calculated as 
R(ρコq)= (L-R(ρ))U R(q)， 
whereas the (logical) implication given by (2.1) is not a property of which the range is found 
in L， but a statement which is thought to stand on a higher level than ρand q. i.e.， isa 
meta-object in comparison with ρand q， since tha objects of observation wi th respect to (2.1) 
areρand q themselves. 
Even when R(ρ) is certainly asserted to be a determinate aggregate (i.e.， a set)， itis 
possible that whether R(t) be finite or not is essentially dubious， or so is whether R(ρ)nM 
be an empty set or not for a special set M c L (ρ). In such cases， ifthe assumption that R(ρ) 
is finite leads to a contradiction， then R(ρ) must be infinite， and if the assumption that R(ρ) 
n M=ダleadsto a contradiction， then it must be that R(p) n M 宇ダ. Thus， ifonly it is 
certainly promised that R(ρ) should give a determinate aggregate， we may use the concept of 
R(ρ) in our (objectivist) logical calculus， though we do not know it in al its details. How-
ever， this may not necessarily be a fact directly ascertained in connection with the axioms 
postulated on the primitive universe， but it seems rather correct to say that the admission of 
R (p) to be used in the calculus is simultaneously demanded wi th the admission of the 
concept R(ρ) as a set in the annexed set theory. 
When a proof of a proposition P (to be true) is made by showing the validity of P' the 
interpretation of P in the annexed set theory， ifany inappropriateness is to be inserted in the 
course of the proof， itis possibly expected that the annexed set theory is responsible for that 
inappropriateness. However， as the annexed set theory is also set under the regulation of the 
empiricist pragmatism， no pure set-theoretical inappropriateness can methodologically be 
expected to stray into. Therefore， ifany inappropriateness is to be inserted， itmay not be 
other than some sets or classes cannot be perfectly defined out in the original proto-con-
struction 
About two propositions 51 and 52， ifit is provable that if 51 is true so is 52 and if 51 
is false then 82 cannot be fully true， then we write 
51(二今)52 (2.2) 
(329) 
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and say“51 imρlies 52". If we have， inaddition to (2.2)， 
52(コ)51 (2.3) 
51 and 52 are said to be equivalent and we then take them as stating the same thing. If 
(2.2) is the case but (2.3) is not， then there must be at least one event for which is found 
52^~51 
not to be a fallacy， so that we may in effect have that 
52 = 51V(52^~51) (2.4) 
The logical decomposition (2.4) may be considered to give a quantitative decomposition 
of 52・ Letus discuss this point more in detail. If a proposition 5 may be convinced to be 
possible， there must exist at least one evidence to verify it. Moreover， in our view， this 
evidence is requisitely demanded to be concretely ascertained， inany way， inconnection with 
the primitive universe， that is， to be an event concretely defined on the universe. Such an 
evidence is called an objectivist one. If there exists the maximum aggregate of objectivist 
evidences of 5 as a determinate one (ie. a set)， we denote it by E(5) and cal it the ωamtle 
range of 5. We may say 5 is verfiable in E(5) on condition that E(5)二件ダ.IfE(5)=ダ
S isfalse， and if E(5)ヰダ then5 is possible. 
If 51 and 52 are possible propositions， (2.4) may be considered to be equivalent to the 
relation 
E(52) = E(51) U E(52 ^  -51) 
So， if(2.2) holds， we have 
E(52)三E(51).
Thus being the conditions， ifwe take 51 and 52 as properties， with regard to the definition 
of (2.1) we have 
51二今52 (2.5) 
because we may then take as R(5k) = E(5k) (k= 1， 2). Thus we may generally adopt the 
notation (2.5) instead of (2.2) 
Thus accumulating definitions and distinctions， we will have various implicative rela. 
tions to be applied to analysis. The study of these relations may， closely related to the 
annexed set theory， be developed on. The thus promised theory of relations is referred as 
the annαed methodology for the intended objectivism. 
3. Critical Topics 
( 1 ) Level 01 a Protosition. For a given proposition P， ifE(P) is to be a determinate class， 
it is thought requisite that there exists a unversal set of events L(P) which promises the 
relation 
E(P) S L(P) 
and satisfies the following conditions; 
i ) every objectivist evidence of P is contained in L(P) ; 
i) every objectivist counterevidence of P (i.e.，evidence by which will be verified that 
P does not wholly hold) is contained in L(P) ; 
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ii) if there is any event e such that， ife can neither be an evidence nor a counter-
vidence of P， P can neither be decided as wholly true nor wholly false， then e iscontained in 
L(P) ; 
iv) L(P) contains no other event beyond the stipulations i)， i)， and ii) 
If L(P) is determinate， P is said to be objectivistかquantiliedby L(P) and then L(P) is 
called the level of P. If L(P) may not be thought as determinate， then is regarded as 
meaningless and is renounced. The previously suggested interpretation P' of P in the 
annexed set theory may be expressed as a proposition on L(P). 
( 2) Suρlemental Leap lor Objectivist Conjecturing. In order to treat the proposition 
“There are infinitely many prime numbers" set-theoretically， we will arrange the prime 
numbers totally in an increasing sequence asρl( =2). P2( =3)， P3(ニ5)，….Then， ifU = the 
total set of natural integers， En = lPl，…， Pnf ，却 dLn = U~ En， the assumption that there 
exists an integer n such that no prime number can be found in Ln has， as well known， led to 
a contradiction. In this case， indicating by P the above proposition we may have 
L (P) = 1 Ln I n = 1， 2 ，…}. 
This L(P) seems to be very naturally conceived in connection with the universe U. How 
ever， the assumption 
(ヨ n)(Lnl(¥:fk=l， 2，…)(LnnEkニダ)) (3.1) 
is merely an abstract imagination because it is practically impossible to examine over al of 
Ln. 
We could fortunately reach a contradiction so that the proposition was conc1uded to be 
true. But， ifwe could never reach any contradiction， the inquiry whether or not finite is the 
set of prime numbers might never be given any answer. Eventually， the set of prime 
numbers is essentially an unknowable object (in practice). In effect， the assumptive possi 
bilitiy of (3.1) may be found only when our eyes are cast upon the annexed inethodological 
field provided there. Thus the above conc1usion by means of the method of absurdity is 
considererd as a suρlemental leab favored by fortune. 
( 3 ) lmpeげ告ctness01 Axiomatics. There had been a prospect that the fifth axiom of the 
euc1idean geometry (i.e.， the axiom of parallels) might be derived from the other part of the 
system. However， no geometrician could lead to the conviction that the fifth axiom should 
be requisite. Nowadays， we are convinced that geometry may yet consistently hold if the 
fifth axiom is altered， However， we also say that， in the euc1idean system， the notion of 
parallelism may not be ferfectly given if the fifth axiom is unused. 
The infiniteness of the set of prime numbers should not be changed by any additional 
postulate， that is， that infiniteness is an objectivistly destined property. If pome property of 
an event is undecidable in the proto-construction， itis said to be objectivist1y undestined. In 
this context， itmay be said the the prote叫 Tstemis only imperfectly accomodated about the 
undestined properties. 
( 4) Elimination 01 UnmωsurabiliかIfA is a subset of a set M， itmay be thought 
(331) 
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essentialy natural if we claim that A then may not be larger than M 判 Accordingto the 
literature， this claim was set in Euclid's‘Element' (= Stoicheia) as a common notion. 2) 
However， in the theory of sets， the notion of a determinate aggregate M is read but vague 
It is firstly demanded that， ifM is determinate， then we have 
I;:fxεU: xεM.V.x任M (3.2) 
But， in using the quantifier I;j， this relation may not practically be traced. So， itmay not be 
applied beyond the formal use 
lf M and G are determinate aggregates of points in a euclidean space E， itseems very 
natural if we claim 
係M宅三侃 G (3.3) 
(fn meaning the a priori measure) when M 亘 G.However， as well known， we here are not 
allowed to assert the relation (3.3) but for the condition that both M and G are綴-measurable. 
Assume that M is determinate but is not promised to be 綴 -measurable. Then， ifM is 
the total class of 綴 -measurablesubsets of M， and if 
b = sup綴A(AεM)， (3.4) 
it appears very plausible that 
fnM宅三b. (3.5) 
In effect， itis clear that we have (3.5) if M is綴 -measurable.
To tel the truth，“M is unmeasurable" is a very obscure statement. Let us take the case 
of 勿-measure.This measure is but an extension of Lebesgue measure m. When M is Le-
besgue measurable， then M is also勿 -measurableand 
勿M=mM (3.6) 
Except for the relation (3.6) (in case of m -measurable M)， fn is not in advance restricted in 
any positive way. We thereupon only require that fn should be thought as the most natural 
measure to be associated with the space E. 
Since thus no other positive restriction than (3.6) is imposed to fn， if it is convinced that 
an aggregate M is a determinate one in E， there is no positive objection against the 
fn-measurability of M， so that we may only wait for any device to assign M an adequate 
value fnM Thus， itappears that 綴 unmeasurabilityis as much unascertainable a notion as 
that of indeterminateness (of an aggregate). This being so， the difference between the 
two notions may， as it is， be said to have been left as imperfect in the present system. 
Therefore， ifwe eliminate the difference， it will be that we make the difference absorbed 
in the imperfection of the present system. 
Consequently， we decide to make it be an objectivist assertion that if M is a determinate 
aggregate (iιa set) M is 綴 measurabletoo and 
b=仮M
b being given by (3.4). Moreover， the following logical dogma may， in this context， be found 
very convenient : 
Pγincztle 01 fI民M邑asuγeDestination. When A is a deteγmznαte aggregate 01争oints(i問 α
• ) Incidentally， Zeno's paradox “Half a given time is equal to double the time" may be regarded as of an 
abnormal construction to be rejected from our measure-theoretical discourse when the originaI set is of 
positive measure 
(332) 
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euclidean sρace)， iftheωsumρtion that A is m-measurable， leads to no other value thanαto be 
assigned as I初A，then A is m-measurable and 
α=綴A.
(5) Emρiricist Pragmatism. Taking some proposition as a hypothesis， ifthere may be 
found neither evidence to verify it nor contradictory circumstance to deny it out， that 
hypothesis may give only an illusion of wanton announcing. If we yet allow such an illusion 
to pretend any regard to be connected with our inference， itis simply a consumption because 
no concrete event is thereby promised. Thus it is found to m北ea demand of the empiricist 
pragmatism that we should renounce any such illusional thesis as a removable noise. 
For instance， we have removed the notion of an ordinal number to correspond to a 
continuum from our list， because it never promises any summable3) sequence of sets corre 
sponding to its sections to reach a limiting set of positive 綴-measure.However， an as.sertion 
of renouncement should not be so simply used. It is also notable that an apparent (orρrzma 
I匂cie)illusional thesis may possibly be utilized for some extensional renovation ofaxiomatics. 
In suce cases， the theses shall not be considered as mere noises. 
( 6) Epistemo-logたal System. Euclidean geometry may be preferable to Bolyai-
Lobachewskian geometry in respect that the former admits similar figures. Such a prefゐ
erence may be considered to follow from epistemological reflections. 
It will be insufficinent for a theory of measure in an euclidean space， ifthe space is 
simply given as a mere total aggregate of points， because then may be found no treatment for 
the fact that any linear intervals of different lengths can be put into one-to-one corres 
pondence (between the points in them.). That is， the notion of a point， ifit is independently 
presented of any other constructive relations to the space than the one of its mere situs， wil 
half lose i tsspatial meaning. 
Such being the state， itwould be well first to show infinite sequences of partitions of the 
space itself and next define the points as the limiting elements of cels of partition. In 
effect， points may not be understood to make up any set of positive m-measure without the 
notion of point measure (i.e.， the abstract size of a point). 
Eventually， the contents of reflections or renovations above-stated may be said to 
establish an ゆistemo-logicalsystem to be associated with the intended theory. 
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